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Abstract 
Economic growth and financial intermediation are highly correlated. Both 
bank-based systems and market-based systems can be used for 
intermediation. However, the financial crisis in Japan and in the US has 
put the developing countries in a dilemma in choosing a bank-based 
system or a market-based system for the channelization of funds from the 
surplus to the deficit sector. Bangladesh is no exception. In this regard, 
the present study, which is based on secondary data, identifies the causes 
of the global financial crisis and its remedies. In addition, the study 
highlights the operation of the existing financial system and its 
performance in Bangladesh. It also recommends a sustainable financial 
system for Bangladesh with some key factors, which are required for its 
well being in particular and of the economy at large.   
 
Keywords: Bangladesh, Central Regulatory Authority (CRA), deregulation, global 
financial crisis.  
 
Introduction 
 
The economic growth of a nation heavily relies on the channelization of funds from the 
surplus to the deficit sector, which can be done through the process of intermediation. 
This intermediation process can be bank-based or market-based, depending upon the 
characteristics of a country. For example, in Japan and Germany banks dominate the 
intermediation process, whereas Anglo-Saxon countries rely more on the market for 
their financing requirements (Suzuki et al. 2008). People in developing and under-
developed countries are always in a dilemma regarding the development of their 
financial system. They are not sure whether to go for a bank-based system or a market-
based system. However, before the US financial crisis, market-based systems were 
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considered as superior to bank-based systems. But now both the two systems have 
failed: the bank-based system failed in Japan and the market-based system failed in the 
US. Therefore, under the present scenario it is really difficult to say which one is better, 
and developing a new model is not at all an easy job to do, but is not impossible. 
Looking at the grassroots of the two systems‟ failure will definitely give some clear 
insights into the development of the future financial system.   
Why did the two systems fail in Japan and in the US? The Japanese relationship 
banking system worked very well from the 1950s to the mid-1970s.  Under this system, 
a firm maintains a long-term relationship with a bank from which it obtains the lion 
share of its financing requirements. The main banks also play a corporate monitoring 
and governance role by intervening whenever things go wrong for the firm, and as a 
result of this the main bank system also refers to a system of corporate financing and 
governance (Aoki and Patrick 1994). But everything started to change when the 
government went for deregulation during the 1980s. The capital structure of Japanese 
firms underwent a dramatic transformation. Reputed firms with higher profitability and 
growth opportunities with low risk increasingly depended on capital markets for their 
financial resources, while firms with lower profitability continued to depend on bank 
borrowing during the 1980s. Strict bank monitoring also induced firms to rely on stock 
and bond markets. This large shift along with the freedom allowed banks to take bad 
risks also meant more banks were competing for deposits (Krugman 2009). The ultimate 
outcome was moral hazard and speculative investment that led to the financial bubble 
and its „bursting‟ during the 1990s.      
On the other hand, the market based system was running successfully before 
2007 in the US. Everything dramatically changed when the bubble burst in 2008. Many 
scholars have been trying to identify the fundamental causes of the financial crisis and 
accordingly give their opinions.  According to Solos (2008), excess in financial markets 
is due to (i) the regulators failure to exercise proper control and their inability to 
understand the consequences of financial innovations, (ii) the excessive use of leverage 
supported by sophisticated risk management models that can calculate known risk but 
ignore uncertainty inherent in reflexivity, and (iii) the introduction of financial products 
and mechanisms based on ambiguous assumptions. Before the bubble burst borrowers 
with less than perfect or no credit history could get a loan. All of these factors led to the 
formation of financial conglomerates that were considered as organizations too big to 
fail. But in reality the reverse has happened. In addition, there is every possibility that 
conflicts of interest will appear in the bank‟s operations in the future whenever these 
large financial conglomerates actively participate in the underwriting of financial 
instruments, financial intermediation, secondary market activities, and managing 
investors‟ funds (Kaufman 2009). They have also induced changes in the perception of 
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liquidity. Before the credit bubble it was treated as something related to the asset side of 
the balance sheet, whereas during the credit bubble it was considered as something 
relating to the liability side.  
Posner (2009) suggests that low interest rates in the early 2000s and the 
deregulation movement that began in the 1970s in fact laid the foundation of the crisis. 
Low interest rates made borrowing cheap, and that resulted in low personal savings rates 
and high personal debt rates. It also encouraged people to purchase houses and invest in 
stocks, which led to asset bubbles and consequent bubble burst. On the other hand, 
deregulation allowed financial intermediaries like investment banks, money market 
funds, hedge funds, and commercial banks to offset each other by offering „substitute‟ 
services. In particular, because of the removal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the US, the 
commercial banks extensively relied on short-term credit other than deposits and real 
estate investment trusts (REITs), and were involved in lending in addition to investment 
banking. As a result, the financial market became very competitive and profit margins 
were squeezed. In response to this, banks tried to reduce risk by securitized debt and 
credit default swaps which were liked by regulatory authorities as tools for spreading 
risk and thereby making financial crisis less likely to occur (Zandi 2008). But 
unfortunately this was not true again and almost all of the subsequent losses came from 
pursuing the flawed trading strategy of borrowing short and investing in long-term 
senior mortgage backed securities (Milne 2009). Rating agencies also badly misguided 
the risks and everybody was focusing on meter reading without understanding the forces 
at work (Bryan and Rumelt 2009). As noted by Shiller (2008: 6), “the housing bubble 
combined with the incentive system implicit in the securitization process amplified 
moral hazard, further emboldening some of the worst actors among mortgage lenders.”  
The resulting financial turmoil has deepened at an alarming rate and affects not only 
financial, credit, and currency markets but also the real economy. In Bangladesh, even 
though the impact of the financial crisis has not been directly felt mainly due to 
shielding of the economy from the most immediate effects of the crisis, the looming 
economic conditions and financial market instability in the developed and several 
emerging economies can create adverse impacts on the Bangladesh economy. No doubt 
it is difficult to predict how the financial crisis would affect the poor countries, but it is 
relatively safe to conclude that the effects are more likely to be indirect for Bangladesh 
since the country has little direct exposure to the failing US financial institutions and 
toxic assets in the developed world. Still a developing country like Bangladesh can learn 
many lessons from the global financial crisis and accordingly develop or reshape their 
financial systems so that they can avoid the occurrence of financial crises in their own 
territory. In this regard, the present study was undertaken to propose some guidelines for 
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the development of a sustainable financial system for Bangladesh by focusing on the 
global financial crisis.  
 
Objectives of the Study 
 
The principal objective of the study was to propose a sustainable financial system for 
Bangladesh with reference to the on-going global financial crisis. To accomplish this 
objective, the following specific objectives were covered: 
1. To identify the fundamental reasons of the global financial crisis and the lessons 
to be learnt from the global financial crisis;  
2. To develop a sustainable financial system for Bangladesh;  
3. To suggest a policy framework for the efficient functioning of the proposed 
financial system.    
 
In order to accomplish the above objectives, the first section of this study elaborates 
the existing financial system in Bangladesh and its performance; the second part 
discusses the reasons for and lessons to be learnt from the crisis; and the last part 
proposes a sustainable financial system through some recommendations.  
 
Methodology of the Study 
The present study is based on secondary data. In particular, the study concentrates on the 
existing literature on the global financial crisis in order to detect the reasons for the crisis 
and its corresponding remedies. In addition, various annual reports were also considered 
in order to give a snapshot of the existing financial system in Bangladesh and its 
performance. 
 
The Financial System in Bangladesh – Background 
 
The present structure of the financial system in Bangladesh comprises of various types 
of banks, insurance companies, and non-bank financial institutions. Bangladesh Bank
2
 is 
at the top of the banking system and is accountable for assuring prudential 
administration and central banking activities for all types of banks operating within the 
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banking industry. On the other hand, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of 
Bangladesh is the regulatory body for stock-market related activities. According to the 
Bangladesh Bank Annual Report (2008-2009), the financial system of Bangladesh 
consists of 4 state-owned commercial banks, 5 government owned specialized banks, 30 
domestic private commercial banks including 7 Islamic banks and 2 denationalized 
banks, and 9 multinational banks.  The financial system of Bangladesh also includes 29 
non-bank financial institutions, 298 microfinance institutions, 27 insurance companies, 
and a number of non-schedule and co-operative banks. Out of 29 non-bank financial 
institutions one is government owned, 15 are domestic private, and 13 are established 
under joint venture with foreign participation. Furthermore, Dhaka Stock Exchange Ltd. 
(DSE) and Chittagong Stock Exchange Ltd. (CSE) are the two stock exchanges 
operating within the financial system.   
Currently, two credit rating companies are also working in Bangladesh: the Credit 
Rating Information and Services Ltd (CRISL) and the Credit Rating Agency of 
Bangladesh Ltd (CRAB). In addition, there are five trustees of asset-backed securities 
and mutual funds, seven asset management companies, and six security custodians.  
The process of securitization has not yet geared up in Bangladesh since there are 
only two cases of asset-backed securitization. The first ever asset-backed securities were 
introduced in Bangladesh in November 2004. An amount of BDT 359 million (local 
currency of Bangladesh) was floated in the country by the Industrial Promotion and 
Development Company (IPDC) of Bangladesh, a non-bank financial institution. Later, in 
February 2005 another issue of BDT 190 million was floated by another non-bank 
financial institution, namely the Industrial Development Leasing Company (IDLC) of 
Bangladesh (Siddiquee et al. 2006). On the other hand, loan sales by commercial banks 
and the trading of derivative securities have not yet started in Bangladesh. The 
government is planning to initiate the trading of financial derivatives by the end of the 
year 2010. 
 
Tracing the Development of the Financial System 
 
According to Suzuki and Adhikary  (2009), the progress of the financial system in 
Bangladesh can be organized into three major phases:  the first phase, from 1972–1982, 
a period when the government was focusing on nationalization and reconstruction;  the 
second phase, 1983–1989, when denationalization and privatization took place; and the 
third phase, 1990–the present,  a period when the government has been emphasizing 
financial liberalization through initiating a broad-based financial liberalization measure 
under the name of the „Financial Sector Reform Program (FSRP)‟  (Suzuki and 
Adhikary 2009). 
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Performance of the Banking Sector 
 
The banking sector in Bangladesh is very much competitive. All of the banks are 
operating within a small industry where excessive competition has always existed. The 
prevailing market competition induces the banks to disburse loans without proper 
screening of the borrowers. According to Islam et al. (1999), “in spite of the liberalizing 
and privatizing of the banking sector in the 1980s with a view to increasing efficiency 
and competition, the robustness of the credit environment deteriorated further because of 
the lack of effective recourse on borrowers.”  All of these banks make disbursed loans to 
non-performing loans, which not only badly affects the banks, but also the entire 
economy as a whole. The performance of the banks can be judged on the basis of many 
variables and the non-performing loans to total disbursed loans is one of the significant 
variables that reflects the efficiency of commercial banks. Tables 1 and 2 give an idea 
about the non-performing loan scenario of the banking sector of Bangladesh. According 
to those two tables, the percentage of non-performing loans to total loans in Bangladesh 
has been decreasing over the period from 1998–2007, still the percentage was significant 
(13.20%) during the calendar year 2007. In comparison to South Asian countries like 
India and Sri Lanka, Bangladesh has held the highest percentage of non-performing 
loans to total loan disbursements during recent years. In particular, the percentage was 
13.56% in 2005 compared to 5.20% for India and 9.60% for Sri Lanka.   
 
What Can Bangladesh Do? 
 
There is no doubt that the bank-based system is better than the market-based system for 
any country in the Asia Pacific region. The culture of Bangladesh is more suited to the 
relationship-based banking of Japan. The government can allow banks with sound 
financial health to patronize a particular firm under a specific industry with all of the 
services required to become successful. But it is too late to do so. This may be one 
question to debate since the government has already embraced financial liberalization, 
which fundamentally caused both the two systems to fail in Japan and in the US. 
Another fact is that both the stock exchanges in Bangladesh, namely the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange Ltd. (DSE) and the Chittagong Stock Exchange Ltd. (CSE), are in full swing 
of their operations since the total market capitalization of the DSE jumped to BDT 
931.03 billion on June 30, 2008 as against BDT 475.86 billion at June 30, 2007, 
showing a 95.66 percent increase (DSE Annual Report 2007–2008). On the other hand, 
the market capitalization of CSE increased from BDT 56,364 million in 2001 to BDT 
219,942 million in 2005. In this circumstance, if the government neglects the capital 
market and focuses on the bank-based system it may create more problems. Therefore, it 
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is better to provide a modified version of the existing financial system which will be 
more sustainable in the future. Before that, it is necessary to highlight the fundamental 
causes of the global financial crisis and some recommendations given by various authors 
regarding the US financial crisis.   
 
Causes and Lessons to be learnt from the US Financial Crisis 
 
There are many reasons that worked together to accelerate the credit bubble in the US 
and the corresponding bubble burst in 2008. Figure 1 gives some of the reasons of the 
crisis. Under the present scenario, it is better to concentrate on the recommendations 
given by learned authors, which will provide some insight about the modification of the 
existing financial system in Bangladesh. It will help the government to protect its 
financial system from financial turmoil.   
According to Shiller (2009), none of the proposals suggested by the US 
government after the financial crisis represents a true institutional innovation; rather 
most of them are undertaken from a short-term perspective without considering the full 
range of issues. He suggests incorporating financial innovations with an emphasis on 
assuring safeguards for the society as a whole, of which innovations made by the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh are a good example. They are merely quick fixes that fail 
to address the full scope of the problem. He suggests ensuring the job of extending 
innovations of modern financial technology together with effective safeguards 
throughout the society, and that the innovations made by the Grameen Bank of 
Bangladesh can be an example. 
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Figure 1: Fundamental Reasons of the US Financial Crisis. 
 
Source:  Author 
 
Solos (2008) suggests that a new paradigm, the recognition of reflexivity is required, 
which can be defined as “act of self-reference where an action „bends back on‟ and 
affects the entity instigating the action.” He also argues that the following needs to be 
done: 
 
 The authorities must exercise more vigilance and control during the 
expansionary phase. This will regulate supply of money and credit creation; 
 Regulators must reassert control over the use of leverage. It will reduce both the 
size and the profitability of the financial industry; 
 A clearing house or exchange must be established for credit default swaps, which 
will assure submission of existing and future contracts by fulfilling necessary 
capital structure and margin requirements. 
 
Geisst (2009) mentions that a combined effort of the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury should act together to coordinate fiscal and monetary policies in the US, 
especially when these involve consumer and mortgage credits. He also recommends the 
following for the betterment of the financial system: 
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 Larger down payment and stronger borrower ratios usually would be sufficient to 
slow the agencies‟ intermediation; 
 Change the tax laws regarding capital gains on housing; 
 The whole issue of complexity in financial design needs to be addressed because 
that sort of complexity has produced much confusion among legislators; 
 Securitization process needs to be repaired immediately; 
 European coverage concept of securitization is better than American uncovered 
one; 
 Mortgage credit should be included in the category of consumer credit. 
 
Kaufman (2009) calls for an overseer which will look after the issues relating to 
capital adequacy, business practices, conflict of interest, and other measures with regard 
to consistency and competitiveness and assure institutional set up for the players in the 
derivative markets. Moreover, he suggests to spin-off the assets of big conglomerates 
and they should be under tight supervision so that it will be possible to ensure that an 
institution may be „too good to fail‟ rather than current proposition of „too big to fail.‟ 
He also criticizes the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and wishes to have a more 
effective international supervisory body in order to supervise and regulate major 
financial markets and institutions around the world.   
 
A Proposed Financial System 
 
The financial system of Bangladesh is not yet that complicated and hence it is the right 
time to reshape the financial environment for the future. The introduction of loan sales 
and other financial derivatives will definitely make the market more complex. Most of 
the authors mentioned in this article propose controlled liberalization, since too much 
freedom can ensure economic prosperity in the short run but not in the long run. Under 
the current financial system in Bangladesh, both the depository and investment 
intermediaries enjoy a deregulated environment. Bangladesh Bank monitors the bank 
market whereas Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) monitors the stock and 
bond markets. But the problem is that there is no coordination among the two regulatory 
bodies. There is every possibility that one business organization that takes loans from 
banks as well as issuing securities may not submit the same performance report to a 
bank and the stock exchange. This anomaly of information remains hidden due to lack of 
coordination amongst the two regulatory bodies. Even the credit rating agencies are 
developing their ratings systems by incorporating quantitative models without 
considering the ratings made by the Bangladesh Bank and SEC, although these possess 
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more information about a particular bank or business firm. In this regard, the 
government of Bangladesh can establish a new entity in the name of a Central 
Regulatory Authority (CRA) that will monitor both the banking market and the stock 
market. This would help to overcome the existing problem of information asymmetry 
between the two regulators by maintaining a central financial database, which is 
currently not available in Bangladesh. Figure 2 outlines the proposed financial system, 
however the key role of the authority will be to ensure an effectively supervised 
atmosphere under the ongoing liberalized and market-based regime of the financial 
system. In order to ensure this the proposed CRA has to consider the following key 
factors to uphold a sustainable financial system.        
 
Factors to be considered 
 
1. Partial Loan Sale: During the subprime situation banks and other financial institutions 
sold loans and created new loans. In this there was no monitoring from a bank‟s 
perspective. But this is not good at all. There should be some regulation so that banks 
could not be able to sell the entire loan. This would ensure the involvement of banks in 
monitoring borrowers after securitization. It would also ensure the reporting of loans in a 
bank‟s balance sheet rather than eliminating them from it. The regulators of Bangladesh 
should consider this when loan sales start in Bangladesh. It would be better if the 
government delegates the authority to the proposed Central Regulatory Authority (CRA) 
to implement this partial loan sale arrangement;    
2. The Boundary of Doing Business: The removal Glass-Steagall Act was one of the 
fundamental reasons for the US financial crisis. It eliminated the boundaries of doing 
business for financial intermediaries. In Bangladesh as per the law, commercial banks 
deal with the lending and borrowing of money and only a few of them are involved in 
merchant banking. On the other hand, investment banks deal with advising, underwriting, 
and secondary market activities. The government should continue this segregation when 
it initiates loan sale and derivative trading in the financial market, so that financial 
institutions cannot cross their boundaries and embrace their own downfall by becoming 
too big. It is also important to make sure that the securitization process will not become 
that complex in the future;    
3. Credit Rating Reform: The credit rating agencies also misunderstood the risk during 
the credit bubble in the US. They undertook rating by using their own quantitative 
models. They did not incorporate the ratings done by the central bank and the SEC. 
Currently the same thing is also happening in Bangladesh. But it will be better if the 
credit rating agencies can incorporate the comments of the central bank and the SEC 
regarding an individual borrower or a business firm or a financial institution, since both 
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the central bank and the SEC have their own ratings;     
4. Revisit Deposit Insurance Premium Calculation: So far the rate of deposit insurance 
premium is the same for all the banks, which is not at all justifiable. This encourages 
risky banks to take risky investment and discourages good banks. At the same time, it is 
really difficult to introduce a new system. If the central banks charge different banks 
with different rates, this will badly affect the confidence of the depositors of particular 
banks. Therefore, the central bank of Bangladesh should continue with the same rate but 
can provide other benefits to good banks compared to low-performing banks, so that 
banks always have the tendency to improve their performances.   
5. Coordinated Effort: It is always necessary to maintain long-term stability of the entire 
financial system of a country. Coordinated effort among the regulatory bodies is 
primarily required to do so. The proposed Central Regulatory Authority (CRA) will 
ensure coordination among the Treasury, central bank, and SEC, which will in turn help 
the government to fix fiscal and monetary policies; 
6. Adequate Use of Leverage: Excessive use of „leverage‟ also accelerated the US crisis. 
In order to regulate leverage, sound capital adequacy ratio is an utmost necessity. This 
capital adequacy ratio should not be determined for a long-term basis. It should be 
monitored on a continuous basis to prevent bad consequences. Again the government of 
Bangladesh can delegate the authority to the proposed Central Regulatory Authority 
(CRA) so that banks use leverage optimally rather than excessively;  
7. Controlled-deregulation: It has already been mentioned that deregulation also laid 
down the foundation of the US financial crisis. There is obvious doubt about the future 
continuation of this long cherished deregulation. Now, it is the right time to go for 
controlled-deregulation rather than a free form of deregulation;   
8. Interest Rate Monitoring: This is another macroeconomic factor which is required to 
monitor on a continuous basis. The US financial crisis also makes it clear that a low rate 
of interest is not always good for the economy. It should not be fixed for a long period of 
time. Central Regulatory Authority (CRA) can handle this by consulting with the 
Treasury and the central bank; 
9. Reformation of Reward System:  Awarding large bonuses becomes a serious issue 
after the crisis. This kind of bonus system is also present in Bangladesh, predominantly 
in the private sector. The government should also consider this with immense prudence 
and impose some kind of regulation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The financial crisis will reshape the financial world over years to come. The future 
sustainability of a country‟s financial system largely depends how quickly and smoothly 
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it can adapt to the changing financial environment. It is clear from the crisis that the 
ongoing regime of financial liberalization cannot provide guarantees against financial 
distress. The crisis also urges for the importance of government intervention to regulate 
market players to behave prudently even under the regime of the market-based financial 
system. This study aims at developing a sustainable financial system for Bangladesh, 
with reference to the global financial crisis and proposes to establish a new institution 
CRA capable of generating quality information. The new institution will not focus on 
the administratively regulated financial sector, rather it will ensure an effectively 
supervised financial atmosphere for attaining incentives from market mechanism 
through innovation and competition, which will not only help to enhance the economic 
prosperity of the country but also to sustain it. The important issue for Bangladesh may 
be to translate the current global crisis into an opportunity to step forward under this 
continuously changing financial atmosphere. 
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Appendices 
 
Table 1: Non-performing Loans as % of Total Loans. 
 
Year Total Loans (BDT in billion) NPL as % of Total Loans 
1998 527.32 40.65 
1999 580.83 41.11 
2000 654.42 34.91 
2001 749.49 31.49 
2002 851.73 28.01 
2003 914.90 22.10 
2004 1079.71 17.60 
2005 1292.51 13.56 
2006 1543.60 13.20 
2007 1724.30 13.20 
 
Source: Banking Regulation & Policy Department, Bangladesh Bank, 2008. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Non-performing Loans in South Asian Countries. 
 
Year 
NPL as % of Total Loans 
Bangladesh India Sri Lanka 
2001 31.49 11.4 15.3 
2002 28.01 10.4 15.3 
2003 22.10 8.80 13.7 
2004 17.60 7.20 9.10 
2005 13.56 5.20 9.60 
 
Source: Global Financial Stability Report, IMF and Bangladesh Bank. Financial Sector Review, 
May 2006, Bangladesh Bank
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Figure 2: Proposed Financial System for Bangladesh 
 
 
Source: author 
 
